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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SECTION 1983 AND DUE PROCESS
LIBERTIES-Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.

1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code was passed as
a result of congressional concern for the social and political disability
imposed on blacks during the Reconstruction period after the Civil
War.' Prior to 1938, section 1983 was used primarily to redress violations of the voting rights of blacks,' but since that time the reach of
section 1983 has been judicially expanded so that many constitutional
claims alleging violations under color of state law may be brought
before a federal court.' In a recent case, Kelson v. City of Springfield,4
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified the concept of
what liberties are protected under a fourteenth amendment substantive
due process analysis in the context of a section 1983 action. In Kelson,
the court of appeals reversed the district court and ruled that parents
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the society and companionship of their children." This note will examine the particular requirements necessary to maintain a suit under section 1983, focusing
specifically on the essential constitutional claim in which the cause of
action must be rooted. It will analyze the implications of the Kelson
decision with respect to those requirements. Finally, it will discuss the
relationship between state procedures and claims under section 1983
and the failure of the court to address these considerations in Kelson.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

On March 15, 1982, Brian Kelson, son of Duane and Eleanor Kelson, confronted his teacher with a thirty-eight caliber revolver, demanding that the teacher place his money on the desk top.6 The
teacher complied and then took Brian to the vice principal, where Brian
1. Representative Garfield of Ohio stated: "[E]ven where the laws are just and
equal on
their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal
to enforce their
provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d
Cong., Ist Sess. app. 153 (1871).
2. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927);
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
3. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
4. 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985).
5. Id. at 652.
6. Id. at 652-53.
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7
showed the vice principal a suicide note. School officials called the
8
Springfield Police Department who in turn called the Kelsons. Brian
and the vice principal were confronted on their way to the vice principal's office by a police officer who told Brian that he was in "trouble
with the law." 9 Brian left the vice principal's office, entered the boys'
10
restroom, and fatally shot himself.
The Kelsons filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint
alleged that the Kelsons' fundamental rights of parenthood, guaranteed
by the ninth amendment, were violated without the due process re1
quired by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The Kelsons also alleged violations of their right to association with their son, which was
guaranteed by the first amendment. They alleged that these violations
occurred without the due process to which they were entitled under the
fourteenth amendment. 2 The City of Springfield moved to dismiss the
Kelsons' complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
3
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' In granting the city's motion, the district court held that "parents have no conprotected right to the companionship and society of their
stitutionally
14
children."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's holding with respect to the Kelsons' constitutional claim of a
right to the companionship and society of their child and remanded the
case for the lower court to decide whether the Kelsons had in all other
respects fulfilled the requirements of a section 1983 prima facie case."
In its decision, the appellate court held that parents do possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of
their child, the deprivation of which is actionable under section 1983.16
In order to determine the extent to which the Kelson decision affects
section 1983 claims, it is necessary to examine the history of the purpose and scope of section 1983 and the current controversy surrounding
its provisions.

7. Id. at 653.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 656.
16. Id. at 655.
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A.

BACKGROUND

History of Purpose and Scope of Section 1983

Section 1983 was originally enacted in response to the lawless actions of the Ku Klux Klan, which Southern States and local governments were either unwilling or unable to control during the Reconstruction era. 7 During the first few decades after enactment, the scope
of the act was primarily limited to cases involving deprivations of voting rights.' 8 Gradually, however, the act was applied to cases involving
constitutional claims other than those dealing with the political rights
of blacks. In expanding the coverage, the United States Supreme Court
has reinterpreted and broadened the application of section 1983. 9 Section 1983 in its present form states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. 20
Section 1983 originally had four main purposes: "[T]o override
certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where a state law was
inadequate, 'to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice,' and to provide a remedy in federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State
might have."'" In order to effectuate the legislative purpose of section
1983, the courts have interpreted the statute to require essentially two
17. Senator Pool from North Carolina said the lawless actions of the Klan "impressed the
public mind with the conviction that the communities in which they occur are wanting in
that
moral tone and sentiment which distinguish well-regulated society from a condition of general
demoralization and violence." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 608 (1871).
18. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915).
19. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (the Court reasoned that officers
who fatally beat a young black after arrest were acting under "color of state law" as under
color
of law meant under pretense of law); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)
(the
Court elaborated on "under color of state law" requirement by defining it as a "[mlisuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the
authority of state law."); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 517 (1939)
(the
Court affirmed an injunction restraining various city officials from interfering with the right
of the
plaintiffs to discuss the National Labor Relations Act). For a comprehensive study of the history
of section 1983, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond,
60
Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
21.byMcNeese
Published
eCommons,
1986
v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963) (citation omitted).
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2
elements before a plaintiff can maintain a section 1983 action. First,
the alleged conduct must have been committed by a person acting
under color of state law. 23 Second, the alleged conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
24
Constitution or laws of the United States.

B.

The Requirement of Action Under Color of State Law

In order to bring a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants were not acting on their own initiative, but rather that they were acting pursuant to the execution or im25
plementation of an official government policy. In United States v.
Classic,2 6 the United States Supreme Court held that action taken
under color of state law occurs when there is a "[m]isuse of power
[which is] possessed by virtue of state law and [which is] made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law."' 1 Persistent practices of state officials which become custom or
common usage may have the force of law so as to meet the color of
state law requirement.2 8 Repeated actions of state officials may transform unauthorized predilections into acknowledged practices having
2
the same effect as legislative pronouncements. '
C.

The Requirement of Constitutional Deprivation

In order to successfully bring a section 1983 cause of action, plaintiffs must prove that they have been deprived of a right, privilege, or
22. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), rev'd in part sub nor. Daniels v.
Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (interim ed. 1986).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See also
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985). The Court held that in order for the plaintiff to
present a section 1983 claim against the city for failure to provide adequate training of its police
officers, the plaintiff must prove that there is a conscious adoption of an institutional policy of
inadequate training. Id. at 2436.
26. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
27. Id. at 326. See also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (to act under
color of state law, it is essential that the individual act with knowledge of and pursuant to that
statute); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976) (to act under color of
state law, the state must affirmatively support and be directly involved in the specific conduct
being challenged); Parker v. Graves, 479 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1973) ("An'action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not lie as against a private person in his individual capacity. It is only where
the person acts to deprive another of his federal rights under color of state law that § 1983 provides authority for a federal claim.").
28. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144.
29. Id. at 168 (cited with approval in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362,
368-370 (1940)). "For custom or usage to constitute state action, it must have the force of law by
virtue of persistent practices of state officials." Moore v. City of Pacific, 534 S.W.2d 486, 495

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
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immunity secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.3 0 Courts are continually struggling with the limits of what constitutes a deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, and
immunities.
If a court finds a violation of a specifically enumerated constitutional right, it can apply section 1983 without requiring that the plaintiff seek state remedies.3 " Many types of conduct by state officials acting under color of state law, however, fall outside specific prohibitions
in the constitution." In such cases, the courts either adopt a liberal
interpretation of substantive due process 3 as a substantive guarantee of
freedom from unnecessarily harmful conduct, or the courts turn to a
procedural interpretation of the due process clause.3 4 A due process
claim may be analyzed as:
[A] claim of denial of either procedural or substantive due process, or
both. A procedural due process claim alleges that the state has unlawfully interfered with a protected liberty or property interest by failing to
provide adequate procedural safeguards. The claim focuses on the procedures used by the state in effecting the deprivation of liberty or
property ...
A substantive due process claim. . . alleges not that the state's procedures are somehow deficient, but that the state's conduct is inherently
impermissible, regardless of any protective or remedial procedures it
provides.8
1. Substantive Constitutional Guarantees and the Family
In the context of a section 1983 action, if the court interprets an
asserted right to be a substantive right protected under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, then the deprivation of that right automatically triggers a federal cause of action under section 1983 only if
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See also Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144; Santiago v. City
of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
31. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Brooks v. School Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va.
1983)
(teacher pierced arm of student with a pin as a means of corporal punishment); Martin
v. Covington, Ky., 541 F. Supp. 803, 804 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (suspect in drug case forced by police
to solicit
homosexual act).
33. See, e.g., Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069
(1982).
34. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the
equal protection of law . ...
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
Published35.
by eCommons,
1986
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the conduct which resulted in the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. No amount of notice with an opportunity to be heard will serve to remedy the deprivation. The United
States Supreme Court routinely applies substantive due process analysis to promote certain historical concepts of what is fundamental to the
Anglo-Saxon tradition. 6 One particular area of the law in which the
Supreme Court has actively extended substantive due process protection is the area involving the protection of family interests.
The Supreme Court began its protection of family interests in
Griswold v. Connecticut.37 In Griswold, the Supreme Court determined
that the constitution embodies a right of privacy involving decisions
concerning procreation. The Court found that the first amendment
38
freedoms of speech, association, and the press; the third amendment
9 the fourth
prohibition against quartering of soldiers in time of peace;- 40
amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the fifth
4 1 and the ninth
amendment protection against self-incrimination;
amendment instruction that the enumeration of specific rights is not
42
meant to deny others retained by the people combine to form a43 right
to privacy emanating from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. The
Supreme Court similarly applied the right to privacy to an issue involving the right of procreation in Roe v. Wade."
Since breaking ground with Griswold, the Supreme Court has regularly continued to make decisions directly protecting family interests. 4' The Supreme Court has strived to protect the vitality of the fain36. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (housing ordinance defining family
unit too strictly found unconstitutional).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Griswold case posed the issue of whether a state could lawfully fine or imprison those who chose to use means of contraception or those who provided such
information. Id. at 480.
38. Id. at 482-83.
39. Id. at 484. See also U.S. CONST. amend. Ill.
40. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. See, e.g., Parkham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The Court held that formal adversary
hearings are not required when parents seek to commit their children to a mental institution. Id.
at 606-13. The Court noted that parents have a traditional responsibility of raising their children
and that the family is a unit with the parents exercising traditional parental authority over minor
children. Id. at 602. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court invalidated a
Wisconsin law which provided that any residents having minor children, not in their custody and
whom they must support, could not marry without court approval. Id. at 390-91. The Court
focused on the right to marry as a fundamental liberty interest under the due process clause. Id.
at 383-86. See also Moore, 431 U.S. 494. The Court invalidated a zoning ordinance limiting the
occupancy of a dwelling to members of a nuclear family. Id. at 506. In holding the ordinance to
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
be unconstitutional, the Court recognized that basic liberty under the fourteenth amendment in-
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ily unit against state action which seeks to interfere with the family.
2. The Court's Treatment of Substantive Versus Procedural Due
Process
If the United States Supreme Court concludes that a right is substantively protected, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires notice and an opportunity to be heard 46 before any person may be deprived of that right. When an individual has been
unconstitutionally deprived of a substantive right, section 1983 makes
no requirement that state remedies be pursued before a claim is filed
under section 1983."' Section 1983 was enacted partly in response to a
distrust of state enforcement of constitutional rights. 48 Where an individual is deprived of an interest other than a substantive constitutional
right, such as an interest in property, he or she is still protected by the
due process clause. Deprivation without adequate state process is in itself a constitutional violation, actionable under section 1983. 4 9 In this
situation, the availability of a state remedy is of paramount importance
in determining whether or not there has been "due process" and thus,
whether or not the claimant's rights have been constitutionally violated. 50 In a 1981 decision, Parratt v. Taylor,8' 1 the Supreme Court,
applying a procedural due process analysis, held that when a constitutional violation occurs and the state provides an adequate tort remedy
for the deprivation of that right, then the state remedy itself constitutes
all the necessary due process required by the fourteenth amendment
such that there has been no unconstitutionaldeprivation." 2 The Court's
decision in Parratt reflects a change in attitude toward the efficacy of
state enforcement of constitutional rights and suggests that the relationship between state remedies and section 1983 should be examined
where substantive as well as procedural rights are involved. While the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kelson v. City of Springfield5s remanded many of the section 1983 issues to the lower court, the
cluded the right of the family to live together. Id. Id.
46. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)
(notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.").
47. Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section
1983, 9 HAsTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 545, 546 (1982).
48. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
49. Parratt, 451 U.S.at 543-44.
50. Id.
51. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
52. Id. at 543-44.
53. 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985). Once the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
had decided
that the Kelsons did have a constitutional right that had been violated, the
court remanded the
Published
by
eCommons,
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appellate court applied a substantive due process analysis to the Kelsons' claimed liberty violation but failed to consider an equally tenable
application of procedural due process analysis as developed in Parratt.

IV.

ANALYSIS

54
In Kelson v. City of Springfield, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit applied a section 1983 analysis to determine that parents
do have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and
companionship of their children. While this decision was firmly rooted
in the Supreme Court's tradition of protecting family interests through
55
a substantive interpretation of the due process clause, the court of
appeals failed to consider the applicability of the Supreme Court's procedural due process approach in Parrattto alleged violations of liberty
interests. In examining the propriety of the court's decision, it is necessary to examine the foundations of both the Kelson and the Parratt
decision.

A.

Requirement of ConstitutionalDeprivation

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the appellants had a substantive constitutional liberty interest that had been
violated.5 6 In so ruling, the court stood on firmly established ground,
since the United States Supreme Court routinely applies substantive
5
due process analysis to protect the vitality of the family unit. In
reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on several Supreme
Court opinions which reflected the Court's protective attitude toward
the family. In one case relied upon by the Kelson court, Little v.
Streater,5 8 the Court found that an indigent defendant in a paternity
proceeding has a fourteenth amendment procedural due process right
59
to receive blood grouping tests. In reaching this result, the Court balanced the interests of the state in not affording such tests against the
60
interests of the individual in establishing familial bonds. The Court
reasoned that state interference with the family through a paternity
suit demanded procedural fairness because of the historical importance
state law requirement. Id. at 656. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that the city had an official
policy, custom, or practice of inadequate training for its police officers to hold the city liable. Id.
In order for the court to hold the individual defendants liable under section 1983, the plaintiff has
to show that the defendant's conduct was the product of state policy. Id. at 656-57.
54. 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985).
55. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
56. Kelson, 767 F.2d at 655.
57. See cases cited supra notes 33 & 35.
58. 452 U.S. I (1981).
59. See id. at 17.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
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of familial bonds. 6 '
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then cited Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services,"2 where the United States Supreme
Court decided that an indigent defendant was not entitled to counsel as
a matter of procedural due process. In Lassiter, the Court weighed the
private interests at stake-the government interest in not affording
counsel and the risk that the procedures utilized would lead to erroneous results.6 3 In focusing on the individual interests in Lassiter, the
Court considered the parents' "desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children.' "64 The
Court found the parents' interest in their children to be "an important
interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.' "65
A third Supreme Court case relied upon by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in making its decision offers particularly strong
support for the court's holding. In Santosky v. Kramer,"
6
the Court
held that natural parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their child.17
After citing direct authority for its finding that parents have a
constitutionally protected interest in the care and companionship of
their children, the Kelson court then examined the cases in which
courts have held that such deprivation is actionable under section 1983.
The primary case relied upon was Morrison v. Jones," in which the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the liberty interest in the companionship and society of children exists and that government interference with this interest gives rise to a section 1983 action
for damages. 69 The Morrison court stated that the interests of a mother
in preserving her access to her child are based on familial concepts
recognized by custom and practice for generations and that these inter-

61. Id. at 13.
62. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (cited in Kelson, 767 F.2d at 654).
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
65. Id. (quoting Stanley. 405 U.S. at 651).
66. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
67. Id. at 752-57.
68. 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980)
(cited in Kelson. 767
F.2d at 654).
69. Id. at 1275-76. In Morrison, county officials transported the plaintiff's
son, a German
alien and ward of the state, to Germany because allegedly the plaintiff
was incapable of providing
the special care which her son required. Id. at 1271. The plaintiff brought
a section 1983 action
alleging deprivation of her parental rights without due process of law. Id.
The Court affirmed that
"It]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process
Clause of the FourPublished
byAmendment
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.and the Ninth Amendment." Id. at 1276.
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70
ests are protected under the constitution.
The strongest support for the court's decision in Kelson came from
Myres v. Rask, 71 in which the District Court for the District of Colorado held:
It would be ironic indeed to recognize, on the one hand, the constitu-

tional rights to marry, . . . to procreate, . . . to supervise the upbringing
of children, . . . to retain custody of one's illegitimate children, . . and
to live in the same residence with one's 'family,' . . . but on the other

hand, to deny parents constitutional protection for the continued life of
their child. State action that wrongfully kills one's child certainly interferes with fruition and fulfillment of the fundamental right to procreate.
A parent cannot benefit from his constitutionally protected rights to supervise the upbringing, retain custody, or live in the same residence with
a child if state action unlawfully takes the child's life. To constitutionally
protect families from lesser intrusions into family life, yet allow the state
the
to destroy the family relationship altogether, would drastically distort
72
Clause.
Process
Due
the
by
protected
liberty
concept of ordered

B.

Requirement of Under Color of State Law

Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that
the Kelsons did have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
73
care and companionship of their child, the court did not address the
more complex and significant areas of the section 1983 action pertainof the
ing to the liability of local government entities, the liability
74
appellees.
individual
the
of
school board, and the liability
In order to meet the "under color of state law" requirement
needed to hold the city liable, the plaintiff must show that the alleged
deprivation of constitutional rights resulted from the execution or im75
plementation of official government policy. The Kelsons must show
that the city consciously adopted an institutional policy of inadequate
training of its police officers. Furthermore, they must show the causal
connection between this execution of an official policy, custom, or prac7
tice and the deprivation of the Kelsons' liberty interest. 1 Closely re-

70.

Id.

71. 602 F. Supp 210 (D. Colo. 1985).
72. Id. at 213.
73. Kelson, 767 F.2d at 655; see also cases cited supra notes 32-33, 35-37 & 44.
74. The appellate court never addressed these issues because the district court erroneously
concluded that the plaintiffs did not even have a constitutional claim. Kelson, 767 F.2d at 654-57.
Before a section 1983 action can be maintained, it is first necessary to establish that a right,
privilege, or immunity of the constitution had been violated. Id.
75. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 16
(1985); Monell v. Department of Social Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
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lated to the issue of municipal liability is the issue of school district
liability. A school board may also be held liable if it can be determined
that its actions were "under color of state law" in that it acted pursu-

ant to an official government policy." The burden of proving that the

city had an institutional policy of inadequate training of its police officers may be especially difficult for the plaintiffs to bear. Two recent
appellate court decisions have held that to establish section 1983 liability against a municipality for failure to adequately train officers, the
plaintiff must show more than one isolated instance of unconstitutional
conduct by police.' 8 In addition, the plaintiff's burden has become more
difficult to meet since the Supreme Court requires a showing of gross
negligence rather than mere negligence on the part of the defendant. 79
A second analogous issue that the appellate court left for the lower
court to review was whether the individual defendants may be held
liable under section 1983. Section 1983 requires that for individuals to
be held personally liable, they must have been acting under color of
state law, which, like the requirement for holding municipalities liable,
means that the individual's actions must have been pursuant to an official policy or custom. 0 Imposing liability against the individual defendants may be difficult because the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant acted pursuant to an official policy and not pursuant to his or her
own personal predilections. The availability of the common-law tort defenses of good faith and of qualified immunuty which are available to
defendants increase the difficulties in proving liability against individual defendants. 81
746 F.2d 1413, 1418 (10th Cir. 1984). The Verla court held that the city is liable only if its
employees deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right pursuant to a policy or custom of the
city. Id.
77. See Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 1975);
Harkless v. Sweeney Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321-23 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Seaman
v. Spring Lake Park Indep. School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (D. Minn. 1974) (school district not subject to liability under section 1983, but superintendent and individual members of the
board are liable).
78. See Vippolis v. Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985) (inadequate training of
police officers not inferred from a single episode of alleged unconstitutional conduct); see also
Turtle, 105 S. Ct. at 2427; Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1985).
79. See Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1985) (requiring "deliberate indifference"); Carter v. Harrison, 612 F. Supp. 749, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (requiring "deliberate indifference" or "'gross negligence").
80. See Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1985); Bellows v. Dainack, 555 F.2d
1105, 1106 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977); Glower v. City of New York, 401 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.Y. 1975).
81. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court held that "section 1983 is to
be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." Id. at 418 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Pollnow v.
Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1985) (school official has a qualified immunity absent a
violation of clearly established constitutional or federal statutory rights of which a reasonable
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Due Process Considerations

Parrattis a case containing a section 1983 claim based on alleged
82
violations of procedural due process and is a landmark case in "con83 law because it redefines what constitutes the deprivastitutional tort"
8'
tion of a protected interest without due process of law. The Parratt
Court's holding results in a delay in bringing a federal section 1983
86
claim until a state tort action can be initiated, thus allaying the fears
of some that "every alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a
state official acting under 'color of law' [would turn] into a violation of
's
the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under § 1983.'
Due process analysis considers two types of hearings: a pre-deprivation hearing afforded before the state impairs a liberty or property
interest87 and a post-deprivation hearing held following the government's impairment of rights.8 8 Normally, the pre-deprivation hearing
will be necessary to afford due process protection; however, in Parratt,
the Court determined that in some cases, post-deprivation procedures
will suffice. 89 The courts that have permitted post-deprivation remedies
to satisfy the due process requirements "recognize . . .either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing
90
any meaningful predeprivation process."' The Parratt approach requires a pre-deprivation hearing when the deprivation is the result of a
long-standing state procedure; however, in cases of emergency or where
a pre-deprivation hearing is impractical, an adequate post-deprivation

82. 451 U.S. at 529.
App.
83. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 89 Ill.
the
for
Court
Appellate
The
(1981).
878
U.S.
454
denied,
cert.
3d 701, 411 N.E.2d 1030 (1980),
First District of Illinois defines "constitutional tort" as follows:
This term has been used to describe an area of the law encompassing that which is not
quite a private (common law) tort, but which contains tort elements; it is not a 'constitutional law' matter per se, but it employs a constitutional test. Involved in such a claim is an
alleged deprivation of one of the rights secured by the Constitution (the tort) by one acting
under color of State law.
Id. at 707, 411 N.E.2d at 1036 (citation omitted).
84. In Parratt, a prison inmate sued prison administrators under section 1983 claiming that
prison employees lost hobby materials which he had ordered. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530. The inmate filed a federal action even though Nebraska's tort claims procedure would have provided him
relief. Id. at 544. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that Nebraska tort remedies were
"sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process" thereby denying the section 1983 claim. Id.
at 544.
85. Id. at 544.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 537.
88. Id. at 538.
89. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
90. Id. at 539.
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remedy will satisfy due process."' The ParrattCourt stated that they
could "reasonably conclude, therefore, that the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional dep'
rivation of property without due process of law." 92
The United States Supreme Court later clarified the Parrattopinion in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.93 In Logan, the Court explained that Parrattapplies only in situations which require the state to
act quickly or where it could not otherwise provide pre-deprivation process. 94 The Court concluded that absent these circumstances, a postdeprivation process would not satisfy due process requirements when
the deprivation was effectuated through an established state procedure.95 The tortious loss in Parratt was the result of a "random and
unauthorized act." ' Thus, it would be impractical to require a predeprivation hearing. In such cases, post-deprivation remedies satisfy
due process. However, in cases where the deprivation was the result of
a long-standing state policy or state procedure, post-deprivation remedies would not be sufficient where there had been time for pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard. 97
1. The Kelson Court's Rejection of Parratt
Parrattstands for the proposition that if the property deprivation
was the result of a random, unauthorized act where the state had to act
quickly or where it could not otherwise provide pre-deprivation process,
then post-deprivation state remedies will satisfy the fourteenth amendment due process requirement. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff
has suffered no unconstitutional deprivation actionable under section
1983. The facts of the Kelson case arguably parallel the Parrattsituation. In Kelson, the situation in the school was undoubtedly tense when

91. Id. at 537-39.
92. Id. at 542 (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978)).
93. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, Zimmerman Brush Company discharged the plaintiff
purportedly because his short left leg made it impossible for him to continue working as a shipping
clerk. Id. at 426. Plaintiff Logan brought his unlawful discharge complaint to the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission. Id. The Commission, apparently through inadvertence, scheduled the conference for five days after the expiration of the statutory limitation period for claims.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Logan's claim was thereby extinguished. Id. at 427-28.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 438.
94. The Court said that "absent 'the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation process,' a postdeprivation hearing here would be constitutionally inadequate." Id. at 436 (quoting Parratt,451 U.S. at 539).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 435-36 (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541).
Published97.by eCommons,
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the Kelsons' son held a loaded gun as the police officer encountered
him. It was an emergency situation, and there was no time to afford the
parents notice and an opportunity to be heard before the police officer
took action. As in Parratt,no pre-deprivation process could have feasibly been afforded the Kelsons. 8
In addition to the emergency analogy in Parratt,the Court's analysis in Kelson also parallels Parrattwith respect to the under color of
state law requirement.9 9 Arguably, the police officer's actions meet the
"under color of state law" requirement because the power or the authority pursuant to which the police officer acted was possessed by virtue of state law. The police officer was able to take the action that he
took only because he was clothed with the authority of state law. However, it could also be argued that the actions were unauthorized, random acts by a single officer just as the acts in Parrattwere random and
unauthorized.
Despite the similarities between the two cases, the Kelson court
refused to apply a procedural due process analysis to determine
whether there was an unconstitutional deprivation. Although Parratt
involved a claim arising from a dispute regarding a property interest,
courts have not limited considerations of the adequacy of state remedies only to cases involving deprivations of property interests. Many
courts of appeals have employed a two-part test to extend Parratt to
10 0
include both life and liberty interests. These courts begin by focusing
on whether the alleged state conduct was random and unauthorized
because if the conduct was the result of a long, well-established state
policy, post-deprivation remedies would not be sufficient to satisfy the
n2
due process requirement.10 1 In Juncker v. Tinney, a claimant filed an

98. The Parratt Court recognized:
[E]ither the necessity'of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any
meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful
means by which to assess the propriety of the State's action at some time after the initial
taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539.
99. The requirement of acting under color of state law has been given a broad interpretation
under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department
of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1977). The under color of state law requirement was interpreted to include any state employees who misuse their power which is possessed by virtue of state
law. Id. at 184-85. The misuse of power is made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1946)).
The under color of state law requirement is separate and distinct from the state of mind
requirement, requiring more than mere negligence. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (interim
ed. 1986).
100. See, e.g.. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983).
101. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
102. 549 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1982).
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action under section 1983 alleging violations of procedural due process
in deprivation of a liberty interest. The Junker court argued:
The logic of Parrat permits no principled distinction between deprivations of property and liberty interests. If a deprivation results from a
'random and unauthorized act' by a state official, the State
is no more
able to predict the deprivation, and a pre-deprivation hearing is no more
possible, when the deprivation involves a liberty interest than when it
involves a property interest.103
In Ingraham v. Wright,1°" a case involving a liberty interest implicated
by corporal punishment in schools, the United States Supreme Court
applied an analysis similar to the one subsequently applied in Parratt.0 5 The Ingraham Court found no deprivation of liberty without
due process because the state afforded common-law remedies for personal injury.' 0 6 As in Parratt, the remedies offered in Ingraham were
post-deprivation remedies.
In Brewer v. Blackwell,10 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit offered reasons for rejecting the application of the Parrattdoctrine
to violations of life and liberty. 0 8 The court held that where the deprivation was slight when compared with the burden of pre-deprivation
hearings, then post-deprivation hearings would satisfy due process requirements.' 9 The primary flaw in this approach to the Parrattdoctrine is that it does not take into account the possibility that regardless
of the nature of the deprivation, there may be no time for a pre-deprivation hearing or one may not be feasible if the act is random and
unauthorized. In situations like the one in Parratt, since the acts involved are random and unauthorized, no pre-deprivation hearing can be
held. If any process is to be accorded, it must be post-deprivation.
Another argument often made against extending Parratt to cases
involving deprivations of life and liberty is that a post-deprivation remedy will be adequate in the case of a property deprivation because the
property may be restored and the plaintiff made whole." 0 However, it
is contended that the danger with applying the Parrattdoctrine to deprivations of life and liberty is that once the deprivation has occurred
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, the plaintiff cannot be
restored to his or her former position even if there is a post-deprivation

103. Id. at 576.
104. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
105. Id. at 672.
106. Id. at 668-71.
107. 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 395.
109. Id.
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remedy. In Parratt,the Court repeatedly stressed that the loss caused
by the misconduct of the state official was only an "initial deprivation"
before which a hearing was not required."' However, the Court reasoned that if the state provides an opportunity for the plaintiff to be
restored to his or her former position, then due process has been provided before a "final deprivation." Applying this reasoning to deprivations of life and liberty, if the plaintiff cannot be restored to his or her
former position, then the final deprivation has occurred at the same
time as the initial deprivation.1 1 2 At that point, if the interest lost cannot be replaced, the plaintiff has been finally deprived of his or her
13 The constitutional violation
interest without due process protection.
is then complete, and a cause of action should 4lie under section 1983
even if a remedy is available under state law."
5
This argument was soundly rejected in Ingraham v. Wright."
The dissent argued that because the corporal punishment of students
involved could not be retracted once inflicted, post-deprivation hearings
6
were not adequate to satisfy due process." The majority rejected this
argument holding that the deprivation is not final until the opportunity
the ability of the state to refor a hearing is foreclosed, regardless of
7
plaintiff."
the
store the lost interest to
In deciding that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the care and companionship of their children, which was
deprived in violation of fourteenth amendment due process protections,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kelson failed to consider
the application of the Parrattdoctrine to the deprivation of a liberty
interest, despite the factual similarities of the cases. Each case involved
a potentially random, unauthorized, negligent act' 8 by a state official,
and each case also involved a situation where a pre-deprivation hearing
was not feasible because of the nature of the circumstances surrounding the acts. The Kelson court could have applied the Parrattdoctrine

Ill.

Parratt,451 U.S. at 539-42.
112. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I, 20 (1978) (cessation of
utility services "works a uniquely final deprivation" for which state remedies are inadequate);
Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1983).
113. See Craft, 436 U.S. at 20.
114. See Burtnieks, 716 F.2d at 988-89. But see Toteff v. Village of Oxford, 562 F. Supp.
989, 995 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (post-deprivation remedies adequate to redress destruction of real
property).
115. 430 U.S. 651, 679-80 n.47 (1977).
116. Id. at 696-97 (White, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 679-80.
118. Kelson, 767 F.2d at 652-53. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not decide that the individual appellees in Kelson were negligent or that their acts were random or
unauthorized, but the court did suggest that if the lower court on remand found the acts to be
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/9
random and unauthorized, then a section 1983 action would fail. Id. at 657.
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and held that the plaintiff was foreclosed from seeking a section 1983
remedy because post-deprivation proceedings were available under
state law. Certainty of compensation is not required under Parratt,19
although certainty of an opportunity for compensation is required."' 0
Using the Parrattdoctrine, the Kelson court could have decided
the case on procedural due process grounds and ruled that there was no
substantive constitutional right violated. Certainly, procedural due process considerations should have been addressed by the court.
V.

CONCLUSION

In deciding that the Kelsons had a constitutionally protected interest in the care and companionship of their child actionable under section 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit failed to consider
the extension of the Parrattprocedural due process analysis to alleged
violations of a liberty interest to determine whether there had been an
unconstitutional deprivation of that interest. The court remanded to the
lower court the issue of whether the appellees were acting under color
of state law. In order to establish liability in the lower court against the
city, the plaintiffs will have to show that the city had consciously
adopted a policy of inadequate training for its police officers. In order
to hold the individual defendants liable, the plaintiffs will have to show
that the defendants were able to perpetrate the wrongful act because
they were clothed with state authority. The under color of state law
requirement focuses on the relationship of state procedures and practices to the alleged deprivation which followed. Although section 1983
was enacted without a requirement that state remedies be shown inadequate, it is now time to consider the relationship of state remedies to
the alleged deprivation of substantive rights-particularly where unpremeditated actions are involved-to determine whether the deprivation
was unconstitutional in the sense contemplated by section 1983.
Susan D. Jansen

119. Parran, 451 U.S. at 542. See Daniels. 720 F.2d at 797; Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. Supp.
922, 927 (E.D. Va. 1982).
120. Daniels, 720 F.2d at 797; State Bank v. Carnie, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,
S. Ct. 491 (1983);
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